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Summary: Conflicts are ubiquitous part of our life. One of the main reasons behind the initiation 
and escalation of conflict is the identity, or the sense of self, of the engaged parties. It is, hence, 
not surprising that there is a consistent area of academic literature that focus on identity, conflict, 
and their interaction. This area model conflicts as contests and focus on the theoretical, 
experimental, and empirical literature from economics, political science, and psychology. The 
theoretical literature investigates the behavioral aspects – such as preference and beliefs – to 
explain the reasons for and the effects of identity on human behavior. The theoretical literature 
also analyzes issues such as identity dependent externality, endogenous choice of joining a group 
etc. The applied literature consists of laboratory and field experiments, and empirical studies from 
the field. The experimental studies find that the salience of an identity can increase conflict in a 
field setting. Laboratory experiments show that whereas real identity indeed increases conflict, a 
mere classification does not do so. It is also observed that priming a majority–minority identity 
affects the conflict behavior of the majority, but not of the minority. Further investigations explain 
these results in terms of parochial altruism. The empirical literature in this area focus on the various 
measures of identity, identity distribution, and other economic variables on conflict behavior. 
Religious polarization can explain conflict behavior better than linguistic differences. Moreover, 
polarization is a more significant determinants of conflict when the winners of the conflict enjoy 
a public good reward; but fractionalization is a better determinant when the winners enjoy a private 
good reward. As a whole, this area of literature is still emerging and the theoretical literature can 
be extended to various avenues such as sabotage, affirmative action, intra-group conflict, 
endogenous group formation etc. For empirical and experimental research, exploring new conflict 
resolution mechanisms, endogeneity between identity and conflict, and evaluating biological 
mechanisms for identity related conflict will be of interest.  
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“Violence is fomented by the imposition of singular and belligerent identities on 
gullible people, championed by proficient artisans of terror.”  
- Amartya Sen (2007). “Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny”, p.2. 
1. Introduction 
Conflict and competition are as common in day to day life as cooperation and acquaintance. People 
engage in conflict for various reasons. It can be due to the eagerness to win over the others, or to 
avoid losing, or to break away from a (bad) status quo. Conflict also emerges due to various 
behavioral factors of the involved parties such as pride, spitefulness, and feeling of insult – to name 
a few. One of the most prominent motivations for engagement in conflict, however, is the identities 
of the involved parties. One of the oldest epics in the world, Iliad (circa 1260–1180 BC), describes 
the conflict between people identifying themselves as either Greeks or Trojans. Even in the early 
21st century, various identities – nationality, race, ethnicity, religion, language, immigration status, 
and economic class – turn out to be some of the main reasons for conflict. This study surveys the 
economics literature, and parts of the psychology and political science literatures on identity, 
conflict, and their interrelation. 
As can be expected, the topic of conflict has been a very active area of research for a long time. 
Researchers from Economics, Political Science, and Psychology investigate various aspects of 
conflict with diversified tools and methods. Moreover, the way conflict is defined in different parts 
of the literatures vary substantially. Along with physical conflict, war etc., features such as conflict 
of interest, failure to cooperate, bargaining etc. are often considered as conflict (see, e.g., Bolton 
and Croson, 2012). For the purpose of the survey, define conflict as situations in which engaged 
parties exert costly resources to resolve a dispute or to gain a reward. This definition matches with 
the definition of a ‘contest’ (Konrad, 2009; Fu and Wu, 2019), allowing to employ the knowledge 
of contest theory to structure this survey. Furthermore, although there exists an array of qualitative 
literature on conflict (see, e.g., Ashmore et al., 2001; Deutsch et al., 2011), this survey defines the 
scope of the analysis on the relevant quantitative literature in economics, political science, and 
psychology. 
In the same note, the literature on identity is vast and diversified. There is a long history of 




Sherif et al., 1961, Turner, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In economics, Sen (1985) introduces 
the concept of identity, defining as “how the person sees himself or herself”. Since then a plethora 
of research has been carried out (including by three Nobel Laureate economists: George Akerlof, 
Amartya Sen, and Jean Tirole) in the topic of the economics of identity. The literature defines 
identity as a type of categorization: who a person thinks they are and what they think the other 
people are. Such categorization remains important since it affects one’s interaction with others, 
and the resulting welfare. More formally, Tajfel and Turner (1979) coin that people first categorize 
different identities (through various characteristics such as gender, race, religion etc.), then they 
identify themselves and others into such diverse categories, and finally they compare themselves 
with others – while making decisions. Akerlof and Kranton (2010) summarize that this process not 
only leads to in-group / out-group biases, but the utility itself gets affected by the categorization. 
The identity literature covers various research topics such as organization, education, social norm, 
behavior under risk, gender, politics etc. This survey limits the scope to the interaction between 
identity and conflict. Furthermore, since gender as an identity itself has a major significant part in 
the literature, gender as an identity remains out of scope of this survey.  
There has been recent coverage on the literature on conflict (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2012; 
Wärneryd, 2014) in which various theoretical and applied aspects of conflict and conflict 
resolution are discussed. Similarly, recent coverage on the economics of identity (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2010) discuss how identity is intertwined in our everyday life. Charness and Chen (2020) 
summarize how identity can reinforce greater good, such as improving cooperation, advocating 
equality, reducing discrimination, reducing crime etc. Shayo (2020), in another survey, covers the 
policy related issues of identity. The current survey, on the other hand, focuses only on conflict, 
and points out the possible areas of further research. In this sense, it complements the survey by 
Charness and Chen (2020) and partially Shayo (2020).  
A number of basic questions have motivated the research agenda in the field of identity and 
conflict. Both theoretical and applied research explore the way the salience of either a common or 
a different identity affects one’s decision making. Modeling identity and its effect on individual 
utility is another important area of theoretical research. This area of investigation is also extended 




interest of the social group. The multi-dimensionality of identity and its implementation for 
possible conflict resolution also remains an active research area. Experimental research in identity 
and conflict employ both laboratory and field experiments to test these theories. Researchers also 
explore the effects of real and minimal identity in various tasks. Empirical research, on the other 
hand, are more focused on the issues such as the effects of fractionalization, polarization, and 
political systems on conflict intensity.  
Given the scope of this survey, the continuation first provides a theoretical structure in the 
intersection of identity and conflict, and points out the main theoretical mechanisms and 
contributions in this area.  The focus then moves to the applications and evidences regarding the 
relationship between identity and conflict. This part is divided into experimental results and 
empirical results. The final section then summarizes the existing knowledgebase, and points out 
some of the significant questions in this area that are yet to be investigated. 
2. Theoretical background and results 
Start with a contest theory model of conflict without introducing the conception of identity. For 
the sake of simplicity and intuition, employ only an individual conflict with symmetric players, 
which can easily be extended to asymmetric players, or to group conflict settings. In this model 
the engaged parties expend costly resources such as money, effort, time etc. in the conflict and the 
winner is rewarded with a valuable prize. For the sake of brevity, call such resources as ‘effort’. 
The costly efforts are exerted in order to improve the probability of wining the prize. This prize 
can be viewed as the pride gained in winning a conflict, a piece of land (e.g., Kashmir in the context 
of India, Pakistan, and China), or the spoils of a war. As in the real life situation, irrespective of 
the outcome of the contest, players forgo their efforts. 
Following the same, consider a contest with 𝑁 identical risk-neutral players. Player 𝑖 (where 𝑖 =
1, 2, 3, … 𝑁) spends his costly effort 𝑏𝑖 ≥ 0 to win a prize of common value 𝑉 > 0. The level of 
effort, hence, is considered as the intensity of conflict – a higher effort level also reflects a higher 
conflict level. The probability that player 𝑖 wins the prize (contest success function; Skaperdas, 










≤ 0, and ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 1. This 
means – own-effort weakly increases own probability of winning the contest, whereas opponent 
efforts weakly decreases it; and at least one of the players wins the contest. Various popular contest 
success functions such as the lottery (Tullock, 1980) where 𝑝𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝒃−𝒊) = 𝑏𝑖/ ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑗  if ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑗 ≠
0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 1/𝑁 otherwise; or the all-pay auction (Baye et al., 1996) where 𝑝𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝒃−𝒊) = 1/𝑘 if 𝑏𝑖 
is one of the 𝑘 highest efforts, and 0 otherwise; can be employed in this setting. Without the 
concept of identity, Player 𝑖 tries to maximize his expected payoff: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑉 − 𝑏𝑖.                                                 (1) 
It is possible to introduce the concept of identity in this structure in many different ways. A simple 
way to introduce identity in the utility function is to follow the same approach as in the ‘other 
regarding preferences’ literature. The other regarding preferences literature is broadly divided into 
preference based models, and belief based models. Following the same path, consider one example 
from the preference based identity model, in which identity is introduced through a group 
contingent social preference. This is a modified version of the social preference model introduced 
by Chen and Li (2009) that is employed in the identity literature also by Chen and Chen (2011).  
In this model, a player’s utility is a combination of the own payoff, (relative) payoffs of the players 
with the same identity, and the (relative) payoffs of players with different identity. Formally, if 
there are two identity groups ‘In-group’ (𝐼) and ‘Out-group’ (𝑂) and Player 𝑖 belongs to the in-
group, then their utility function can be written as:  
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖, ∑ 𝑓𝑖(𝜋𝑖, 𝜋𝑗)𝑗≠𝑖,𝑗∈𝐼 , ∑ 𝑔𝑖(𝜋𝑖 , 𝜋𝑗)𝑗≠𝑖,𝑗∈𝑂 )                              (2) 
where 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑔𝑖 are functions measuring relative payoffs between the players. These functions, for 
example, can take the form of inequality aversion as originally introduced by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and employed in contests by Reichmann (2007), Herrman and Orzen (2008), and 
Chowdhury et al. (2018). Presumably, a relatively lower payoff compared to others affects utility 
negatively, whereas a relatively higher payoff can affect utility either negatively (inequality 
aversion) or positively (spite). These effects are expected to be higher while in comparison with 




After imposing some specific functional forms for the contest success function, and for the social 
preference functions, it will be possible to find closed form solutions for the contest game with 
and without identity. Under certain reasonable regularity conditions, such as more spitefulness 
towards out-group compared to in-group, the results show higher equilibrium effort exerted when 
the identity is present versus when it is not. This, in turn, provides a micro-foundation regarding 
why the presence of an identity can increase the intensity of conflict.  
Note that, such group contingent social preference can also occur when the identity of the winner 
is included in the utility. In the contest literature, Linster (1993) is the first to introduce such a 
structure with a lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980), albeit without mentioning the 
term ‘identity’. In this model, Player 𝑖’s valuation of the reward depends on the identity of the 
winner of the reward. Hence, the valuation of the reward for player 𝑖 is a vector 𝑣𝑖 =
(𝑣1𝑖, 𝑣2𝑖 , … , 𝑣𝑁𝑖), consisting of the valuation of player 𝑖 when player 1 wins, player 2 wins and so 
on. It is assumed that everyone strictly prefers own win over others, but can prefer the win of some 
players over some other players – if self-win is not realized. This models an identity dependent 
externality, because the payoffs of the engaged parties do not only depend on their own win, but 
it also on the identity of the winner.1 This can be easily translated into real life phenomena such as 
multi-sided war, or conflict among various ethnicities. This simple model gives some very intuitive 
results. It is found that as players value others’ winning more, they exert less effort, i.e., identity 
dependent externality may result in less conflict. However, if the players only value the winning 
of in-group rivals, and not the out-group ones, then the out-group players increase conflict effort.  
This area of theoretical research is extended by Esteban and Ray (1999), Klose and Kovenock 
(2015a, b) and Bagchi et al. (2019). Esteban and Ray (1999) also use a lottery contest success 
function, but provide a more general structure and focus on the distribution of the types of players 
in different characteristics. They consider many mutually exclusive groups consisting of 
individuals, the outcome to be pure public goods, and a general cost function of effort.  They prove 
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, and analyze the effects of the distribution of players 
                                                          
1 Note that such identity dependent externality is different from outcome contingent spillover (e.g., Chowdhury and 




in different groups on the level and pattern of conflict.2 Klose and Kovenock (2015a, b) investigate 
identity dependent externality with an all-pay auction contest success function. Klose and 
Kovenock (2015b) characterize the equilibria in such all-pay auctions. They find that the standard 
results of all-pay auctions hold only when identity dependent externalities are ‘mild’. With 
sufficient externalities, however, equilibria may not be payoff equivalent, and even identical 
players may earn different payoffs. These results show that with the introduction of identity, the 
standard results in conflict and conflict resolution may not hold. Klose and Kovenock (2015a) use 
the same theoretical structure to investigate the interaction between extremists and moderates. 
They define extremism as a higher per capita effort by radicals compared to centrists. They find 
that under such identity dependent externalities, extremism indeed can suppress moderates in the 
sense that even when the radicals are minorities, they exert higher effort than the moderates. 
Another theoretical application of identity in conflict is carried out by Bagchi et al. (2019). They 
explore the idea of proxy war with three sponsors of war and three proxies. They implicitly assume 
that two of the sponsors are in-group whereas the remaining sponsor is out-group. There exist 
multiple equilibria for this game. However, all the sponsors exert positive effort in equilibrium 
only when the winning reward is small. When the reward is high enough, the two in-group sponsors 
coordinate in a way such that only one of them engage in conflict – reflecting implicit alliance 
formation. The authors also work out conditions for alliance to be formed explicitly. This study 
sheds light on the importance of identity in endogenous alliance formation in conflicts.  
The group contingent social preference approach reported so far, however, is introduced here only 
to provide the conceptual background and to allow a micro-foundation of the results obtained from 
the laboratory or from the field. There are additional preference-based and belief-based approaches 
in the literature to model identity, discussing all of which in detail will be out of scope of the 
survey. Hence, only some of those models are covered. For an excellent and comprehensive 
summary of those approaches, please see Charness and Chen (2020, Sec. 2) and Shayo (2020).  
Among the preference based identity models, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduce the idea of 
norm of the society intertwined with the identities. The players’ utility then depends on their own 
                                                          
2 See also Esteban and Ray (1994) for a measure of polarization that is relevant for identity-wise fragmented society; 
Esteban and Ray (2008) for the interaction of class and ethnicity as identity in the context of conflict; and Esteban and 




action, the action of the other players, and the degree of deviation from the norm. This structure is 
employed to understand various issues such as the labor market, schooling etc. The studies 
discussed till now consider the existing identity groups as given. However, often people form such 
identity groups endogenously. Shayo (2009) considers the issue of one’s endogenous choice of 
groups. Players gain utility from their payoff, the status of their group, and their individual social 
distance from the group they identify with. Bernard et al. (2016) use a similar model, but 
endogenize the social distance as well. These models are also employed in various contexts, 
especially in public economics and trade. Another way an identity group can be evolved is through 
social interaction. Fang and Loury (2005), Freyer and Jackson (2008), and Akerlof (2017) take 
this approach and use various model specifications to endogenize group identity as well as the 
norms for such groups. All these models include identity into the players’ preference system. 
However, this leaves out a very important concept: identity is not only what one thinks about 
themselves, but also what they think about others perceive them to be. Bénabou & Tirole (2011) 
introduce a belief based identity model in which players have incomplete information regarding 
their own identity and make costly investments in building their identity.  
Theoretical investigation on the interaction of identity and conflict are limited, and introducing all 
these diversified models to attain insight regarding behavior in conflict still remains an open 
question.  One such attempt is made by Sambanis and Shayo (2013), who investigate whether a 
common identity among conflicting agents can mitigate the conflict. They also explore the 
relationship between the pattern of social identification and conflict. In this model members of two 
groups are engaged in a group specific public good prize group contest (Katz et al., 1990). The 
social identity has three building blocks: social groups, perceived distances among the social 
groups, and the relative value or status of the social groups. The status depends on the relative 
payoff and exogenous factors. The authors then characterize the social identity equilibria and show 
that a vicious cycle might arise in which conflict persists and the unifying national identity is not 
salient. These results match well with the empirical observations from poor conflicting countries.  
3. Evidences of identity and conflict 
The evidences of the relationship between identity and conflict has emerged even before the 




employed in the field, and experimental method employed in the laboratory as well as in the field. 
The empirical evidences from the field are obtained mostly by economics and political science 
researchers. These results provide us with a direct evidence relevant for the specific cases. 
Oftentimes, however, appropriate data for pursuing such analysis remain unavailable. Even when 
the data is available, an appropriate identification may not be possible. The experimental studies 
run by economists and psychologists, on the other hand, do not face such issues. The experimental 
researchers have a higher level of control and can employ straightforward identification strategies. 
Moreover, experimental researchers are able to investigate the effects of both real (e.g., race) and 
artificial (e.g., student ID number) identities. However, the results from experiments often face the 
critique of lack of external validity and generalization. In summary, both the methods have its own 
benefits and are viewed as complementary tools to understand the research topic better. In the 
continuation first the results from experiments and then the results from empirical research are 
reported.  
3.1.  Experimental evidences 
As defined in the scope of this study, only the experiments that use the features of contests are 
covered in this survey. However, other family of games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma is often 
employed to understand conflict (See, e.g., Bornstein, 1992). For a comprehensive survey of 
contest experiments in general please see Dechenaux et al. (2015), and for conflict experiments 
beyond the structure of contests please see the survey by Abbink (2012). Note also that instead of 
classifying the experimental results in terms of methodology (laboratory or field) used, we 
organize those in terms of the research questions asked.   
Experimental researchers employ both real (often termed as ‘natural’) and artificial (termed as 
‘minimal’) identities to investigate research questions. Clear methodological protocol has evolved 
in the literature implementing either of the identities. While using natural identity, the researchers 
make such identity salient by either mentioning the identity (see, e.g., Chowdhury et al., 2016) or 
by priming on such identity (see, e.g., Shih et al., 1999). For minimal identity, however, the 
protocol is different. Here, the subjects are assigned with some individual level task that is 
irrelevant to the conflict game, and depending on the outcome of this task they are anonymously 




paintings (Chen and Li, 2009). It has been observed in both economics and psychology literature 
that even the minimal identity often has significant effects on subject behavior. For a broader 
coverage of minimal identity and non-conflict literature, and further detail about the methodology, 
please see Charness and Chen (2020).  
The experimental conflict literature started with the famous Robbers cave experiment by Sherif et 
al. (1961). This experiment was run in 1954 in the Robbers cave state Park, Oklahoma (and hence 
the name) in three stages. In the first stage, 22 pre-teenage boys were randomly assigned in two 
groups and the group identity was made salient by performing group work. In the second stage, 
the groups were engaged in various camp games in which only one group can win. In the third 
stage, the groups were integrated and joint teamwork based tasks were run to enforce mitigation. 
This is a real effort group contest experiment with minimal group identity. The researchers 
observed that at stage 2 there were hostility and aggressive behavior against the out-group 
members by both the groups. This result hints at the effect of identity in the escalation of conflict.  
The Robbers cave experiment was run among otherwise homogenous subjects with no prior history 
of conflict. Diab (1970) replicated the Robbers cave experiment in Lebanon with 10 Christian and 
8 Muslim pre-teen subjects divided equally into two groups (5 Christian and 4 Muslims in each 
group). There was an existing historical conflict between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. 
Hence, the within group composition was not homogenous. The two groups were named as "blue 
ghosts" and "red genies". In the second stage (the conflict stage) of the experiment, a physical and 
violent fight broke out between the subjects and the third stage was cancelled. Surprisingly, the 
conflict broke out between the two artificially created groups, and not between the two religious 
groups. This demonstrates that salience of even minimal group can escalate conflict.  
The observation from Diab (1970) only partially in line with the views portrayed in Sen (2007). 
Sen (1985, 2007) coins the idea of multi-dimensional identity. A person can be categorized into 
various groups in terms of their gender, age, language, nationality, race, religion etc. But when 
only one dimension of such identities becomes salient and dominant, then it initiates and escalates 
conflict. Sen (2007, p. 176) notes that “What is done to turn that sense of self-understanding into 
a murderous instrument is (1) to ignore the relevance of all other affiliations, and (2) to redefine 




well as the conceptual confusions are made to creep up.”. If one interprets the color coded group 
in Diab (1970) to be the salient and dominant identity over and above the religious identities of 
the subjects, then it can easily explain the outcome of the experiment.  
However, Sen (2007) also notes that not all the identities have the same effect. Some temporary 
identity that he terms as ‘classification’, may be salient, but will not have the same effect as the 
real identities. Some examples of the classification are shoe size, shirt color etc. This idea is 
supported in Basu (2005, p. 222), who documents that “We hear of religious wars, ethnic tensions 
and the coming clash of civilizations but we do not hear of friction between short and tall people, 
between the bald and the hirsute, or between those who can do mathematics and those who 
cannot.”. If one considers the color coded identity in Diab (1970) as classification, and religion as 
real identity, then the experimental results do not match with Sen’s hypothesis.  
Chowdhury et al. (2016) run a laboratory experiment to test the hypotheses placed by Sen (2007). 
They run a lottery contest between two groups, and employ three between-subject treatments. In 
each treatment, a group of three white subjects are matched with a group of three East Asian 
subjects in a partner matching repeated group contest. In the baseline treatment, no information 
regarding the group composition is revealed. In the classification treatment, following the structure 
of Diab (1970), the groups are either called a blue group or a green group. In the identity treatment, 
the race composition of the groups is common knowledge. They find that the minimal color coded 
identity does not significantly increase the conflict intensity over the baseline. However, when the 
real identity is revealed, then the conflict intensity increases and within group free-riding (defined 
as exerting zero effort) is reduced. These results support the hypotheses of Sen (2007) that a 
salience of a real identity increases conflict, but that of a classification does not.  
Following similar structure as in Chowdhury et al. (2016) with lottery contest success function, 
Chakravarty et al. (2016) run a lab-in-the-field experiment of individual contest in India with 
Hindu and Muslim subjects. Their treatment manipulation involves information regarding the 
religions identity of the subjects, and the degree of religious fragmentation in the subject village. 
They hypothesize that the effort level in homogenous religion pairs should be lower than in 
heterogeneous religion pairs in fragmented villages. Whereas they find support for this hypothesis 




The effects of identity in conflict intensity, hence, is overall positive. Whereas laboratory 
experiment suggests support for the effect in the direction of the theory, field experiments provide 
mixed results – and it depends on the subject demographics. One question that remains to be 
answered, is what drives some subjects to exert a higher level of effort against an out-group 
subjects in a conflict. This can occur due to their parochial altruism, i.e., in-group love, or out-
group hate, or a combination of the two (Bernhard et al., 2006; Choi and Bowles, 2007). Abbink 
et al. (2012) investigate this with a sequence of prisoner’s dilemma game and group contest. In a 
treatment they also allow group members to punish each other after the effort provisions are met. 
They find that effort provision increases with peer punishment. They also find that subjects who 
cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma are likely to exert more effort in the group contest as well. 
Moreover, subjects who exert low effort are punished by peers. Since standard rational models, or 
in-group love or out-group hate in separation cannot explain these results, the authors conclude 
that overall parochial altruism drives the level of conflict. In the context of identity as well, it can 
be inferred that overall parochial altruism increases the level of conflict in the presence of identity. 
This proposition, however, is still to be supported with data.  
Although not strictly within the contest paradigm, two very relevant experiments are worth 
mentioning. Weisel and Zultan (2016), using a modified prisoner’s dilemma game, are able to 
distinguish the motivation of individuals to contribute to the group effort, or to free ride. Klor and 
Shayo (2010) divide their subjects into two different groups in terms of their area of study (a real 
identity). They are then allocated some individual income and had to vote on the redistribution of 
the income. It is found that when the group identity is revealed, a significant proportion of the 
subjects vote to support their in-group even at a cost of their own income. This, however, is not 
the case for the baseline (when the identity is not revealed). Similar type of analyses, as in these 
two studies, can be run in a contest structure as well.    
Can the inclusion of identity compensate the reduction of effort in a group setting compared to an 
individual setting in conflict? Huang et al. (2018) run an online all-pay auction experiment in the 
M-Turk platform to answer this question. Their treatment manipulation comes from the subject 
identity, and the game they play. In one set of treatments the subjects were simply allocated in two 




all-pay auction was either run individually or between three-payer groups. It is well known that 
subjects exert less effort while in a group compared to while contesting alone. The results of this 
experiment show that even when the political identity is made salient, the effort provision in a 
group setting remains lower than in an individual setting.  
3.2. Empirical evidences 
The main questions investigated in the empirical literature in identity and conflict are the identity 
related determinants of conflict, and whether those can be separated from economic determinants. 
Compared to the theoretical and experimental investigations, the empirical literature on identity 
and conflict with field data is relatively new and still developing. This is mainly due to the lack of 
availability of appropriate data and lack of control over the variables. An important exception is 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998), who investigate whether civil wars are caused by economic reasons 
or due to ethnolinguistic identity. They build a simple cost benefit model of civil war, and use civil 
war data from 1816-1992 for various countries to test the hypotheses from the theoretical model. 
In specific, using a probit and a tobit regression they determine the occurrence and duration of 
civil wars. The results show that both identity and economic reasons are responsible for the 
occurrences of civil wars. Economic determinants such as initial income, initial population size, 
available resources, along with the identity related determinant ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
turn out to be significant determinants of conflict (civil wars). Interestingly, they find that the 
degree of identity fractionalization has a non-monotonic effect on the conflict, i.e., a moderate 
level of fractionalization affects the conflict the most.  
In the same line Reynal-Querol (2002) investigates the effects of religion and language related 
identities in the intensity of civil war, and the role of the existing political system in conflict 
resolution. She gathers and combines data from various sources for 138 countries for the timeframe 
of 1960-1995 on civil war, level of democracy, characteristics of political system, rebellion, 
education, export, religious fragmentation, linguistic fragmentation, religious polarization etc. 
Running a logistic regression on the incidence of ethnic civil war, the author finds that both animist 
diversity – a measure of identity especially in Africa – and religious polarization are significant 




linguistic differences as a predictor of civil war. Finally, a consociational political system 
significantly reduces the occurrences of civil wars.  
Esteban et al. (2012a, b) investigate the relationship between ethnicity and conflict. Unlike Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998) or Reynal-Querol (2002), the authors do not restrict conflict only to civil war, 
but rather define it on the basis of death toll. Esteban et al. (2012a) use the three measures of ethnic 
distribution: polarization, fractionalization, and the Gini-Greenberg index introduced in Esteban 
and Ray (2011) and investigate their effects on conflict (while controlling for various other factors 
such as population, GDP per capita, Democracy etc.). This is important since these measures 
essentially show the social distances among identity groups.  Using data from 138 countries over 
the time period of 1960–2008 they find that both the ethnic polarization and the fractionalization 
measures have significant positive effects on ethnic conflict, whereas the effects of the Greenberg-
Gini index is significant and negative. These results suggest that conflict is affected by both public 
and private components. This investigation is extended in Esteban et al. (2012b) in which similar 
data, research aim, and empirical strategy are followed. They reaffirm that polarization and 
fractionalization jointly influence conflict. Moreover, polarization is a more significant 
determinant of conflict when the winners of the conflict enjoy a public good reward; but 
fractionalization is a better determinant when the winners enjoy a private good reward. Hence, this 
study points out the relationship between various measures of social distance of the identity groups, 
type of the conflict, and conflict intensity.  
Mitra and Ray (2014) revisit the issue of economic versus identity related causes of conflict. In a 
theoretical model of inter group conflict, they show that as the income of a group increases, the 
conflict intensity against that group increases, while the conflict intensity of that group decreases. 
The authors then test this theory empirically in the context of Hindus and Muslims in India for the 
time period of 1979 to 2000. Ethnic conflict is defined in three ways: the number of casualties, the 
number of death, and the number of riot outbreaks. They run a Poisson specification (and 
robustness checks with negative binomial and ordinary least square). The results show that indeed 
an increase in the per capita expenditure (a proxy for income) of the Muslims significantly explains 
the occurrences of conflict, whereas an increase in the expenditures of the Hindus has the opposite 




decreases the likelihood of conflict up to 8.1%, whereas an 1% increase in the per capita 
expenditure by the Muslims increases the likelihood of conflict up to 9.9%. The results hint at the 
possibility that identity related conflict may occur not purely due to the identity differences, but 
due also to economic reasons perceived by the involved parties.  
In a related study, Girard (2017) finds inconclusive effects of inequality in religious conflict in 
India. Finally, Dasgupta and Pal (Forthcoming) extend this idea into caste related conflict, 
especially the untouchability issue (avoidance of physical contact by the higher caste people 
towards the lower caste), in India. They first use a contest theory model, and then use the in data 
from the India Human Development Survey 2011-12 to arrive at related but somewhat orthogonal 
conclusion of Mitra and Ray (2014). Dasgupta and Pal (Forthcoming) find that while 
untouchability and related conflict depends on the inter-group distribution of resources across both 
caste and religious divides, it becomes less prominent with a relative increase in the collective 
resource endowment of the lower castes.  
4. Discussion  
This is a survey of the literature on identity, conflict, and their interrelation. Conflicts are modeled 
as contests and the theoretical, experimental and empirical literature mostly from economics, 
political science, and psychology are included. A large part of the theoretical literature focuses on 
the behavioral aspects – such as social preference and beliefs – to explain the effects of identity on 
behavior. It also investigates the issues such identity dependent externality, endogenous choice of 
joining a group etc. The experimental literature begins with the result that a salience in the 
difference in identity increases conflict. Further investigations in the laboratory and in the field 
explore the idea of real versus minimal identity, multi-dimensional identity, parochial altruism, 
and their effects on conflict behavior. The empirical literature focusses on the various measures of 
identity, identity distribution, and other economic variables on conflict behavior. This whole field 
of literature is still emerging and it can be extended to various important avenues. There still 
remains a list of topics to which the theoretical and applied literature can be extended.  
First of all, the current literature confines itself into the traditional aspects of conflict – in which 
engaged parties exert unidimensional effort to win the conflict. However, there are important 




the identity and conflict field. In many conflict situations the players not only exert effort to 
improve their own likelihood of winning, they also exert unproductive effort to damage the 
likelihood winning of the rivals. Example of such acts are the ‘scorched earth’ policy, economic 
sanctions, destroying the supply line of the rival, to name a few. In the contest theory literature 
this act is termed as sabotage. Although there is a long literature on sabotage (see Chowdhury and 
Gürtler, 2015 for a survey), there is no existing study analyzing the effects of identity on sabotage. 
Both theoretical and applied investigations in this area will be interesting.  
There is also a vacuum in the identity and conflict literature in the area of attack and defense. The 
existing literature views the parties engaged in conflict ‘similar’ in the sense that they exert effort 
with the same objective – to win the conflict. In real life, however, oftentimes there are ‘attackers’ 
(e.g. terrorists) who exert efforts to win over ‘defenders’ who exert efforts to defend (e.g., the 
government).3 Chowdhury and Topolyan (2016a, b) employ lottery and all-pay auction contest 
success functions in group attack and defense games and show that the results become very 
different compared to the standard contests. The idea of attack and defense is also highly relevant 
in identity conflict (e.g., Mitra and Ray, 2014), but any research is yet to be conducted in this area.  
From a theoretical point of view, many other extensions are possible. There is an existing body of 
literature on endogenous group or alliance formation in identity, and in contest theory. But 
currently there is not many studies that intersect on both the areas. Moreover, all of the identity 
dependent externalities research are conducted with the assumption of complete information. The 
effects of information and ambiguity will make the topic closer to real life. It may also be possible 
in case of identity driven group conflict that there are fragmentations within a group due to multi-
dimensional identity, which leads to intra-group conflict (see, e.g., Hausken, 2005; Choi et al., 
2016). Whereas there are empirical investigations in this area, a solid theoretical investigation will 
be highly appreciated. Finally, the controversial topic of affirmative action (Chowdhury et al., 
2020) in contests is aptly interrelated with the idea of identity. One can observe from the field that 
identity driven affirmative action may lead to or may mitigate identity driven conflict. Girard 
                                                          




(2020) provides a first empirical result from India that such affirmative action increases the number 
of murder of lower castes. However, a theoretical investigation in this is yet to be conducted.  
In a laboratory experiment Cadsby et al. (2013) find that priming about professional (compared to 
personal) features encourages females to join competition more. It is well known that females are 
often averse to be involved in conflict. Hence, it will be interesting to investigate whether priming 
can affect female conflict behavior as well.  Experiments can help us to understand the components 
of conflict resolution. Kimbrough and Sheremeta (2013) show that side payments help resolving 
conflict even without commitment. Kimbrough et al. (2014) show that mediation also helps 
resolving conflict in the laboratory. However, Fisher (2001) argues that mediation could not 
mitigate the identity driven ethnic conflict in Cyprus. There is no experiment involving identity 
driven conflict that tests the effectiveness of conflict resolution tools in the laboratory. Note also 
that there is a recent neuroscience literature on the economics games of conflict (see, e.g., De Dreu 
et al., 2019; Rojek-Giffin et al., 2020). It will be interesting to understand the neuro-economic 
results on identity and conflict as well (Huettel and Kranton, 2012).  
Very many interesting applied empirical research can also be conducted in this area. How a 
macroeconomic or global event, such as the COVID-19 Pandemic, affect the inter-relation 
between identity and conflict (see, e.g., Chowdhury, 2020) is an important and interesting area of 
research. This may also help answering a core question that remains unanswered: whether an 
identity instigates conflict, or a conflict makes identity salient.  To point out further possible 
extensions of empirical research, both sabotage and affirmative action under the shadow of identity 
remain important areas. The issue of multi-dimensional identity and its effects on conflict 
resolution will also be appealing. As it is not possible to theoretically or experimentally evaluate 
the effectiveness of public policies to mitigate identity related conflict, empirical research in this 
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